Much has been written about the economic crisis that has befallen Cuba since the 1990s. Likewise, measures that were applied to solve the country’s economic bankruptcy and “safeguard the conquests of socialism” have been thoroughly documented and discussed. It is therefore preferable to concentrate my analysis on something that may have gone unnoticed by accident, or simply intentionally overlooked.
If there is a commonality about what has been written on the issue, or at least the part that was accessible, it is the widespread dismay with the importance of restructuring through economic measures taken, reluctantly, because there was no other way out.
Some seem to think, perhaps, that we could have done without them. Really?
What no author acknowledges, at least not explicitly, is that it was precisely those “perverse” measures that preserved the Cuban social model at the time of its greatest risk. Ergo, they were not necessary evils, but the result of a conscious political move that could well have been taken much earlier. If so, perhaps they would not be blamed for the collateral damage assigned to them: the resulting inequality and poverty.